




ne of the key roles banks have traditionally played is in the execution
of payments among participants in the economy. Liabilities issued by
banks, such as demand deposits, are a primary means of payment. The
widespread acceptability of such private liabilities requires a reliable method
for the settlement of such obligations. In a world where people and economic
activity are dispersed in space and time, settlement often requires a method
for communication between locations where purchases of goods take place and
those where payment liabilities are issued. That is, the use of bank liabilities
as means of payment requires the support of an interbank network for clearing
and settlement.
Throughout U.S. banking history, such multibank networks have played
important roles. In New England during the Free Banking period (1836–1863),
the system that was centered around the Suffolk Bank in Boston widened the
area over which many banks’ notes could circulate at par.1 In the latter part
of the nineteenth century, banks participated in clearinghouses for the clearing
and settlement of local checks and had correspondent relationships to handle
checks over greater distances.2 While the Federal Reserve (the Fed) ultimately
took over a large part of the clearing and settlement of checks, the banking in-
dustry has developed other private, multilateral networks for handling interbank
payments. Most notable, perhaps, are the nationwide credit card associations.
Recently, interbank networks have received considerable attention. The on-
going growth and consolidation of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) networks
has stimulated discussions in the academic and public policy communities of
possible antitrust issues raised by such large joint ventures of banking organi-
zations. Much of the discussion of possible public policy concerns regarding
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coming forms of electronic money centers on the network characteristics of
these instruments.
This article takes the position that networks are fundamental to the role
played by intermediary institutions in the payment system. Clearing and settle-
ment, as the means of managing the ﬁnancial relationship among individuals or
institutions across time and distance, are inherently network services. The char-
acteristics of network services have important consequences for the industrial
organization of the payment system.
Arrangements for clearing and settlement of payments, whether private or
public, involve an effect that is sometimes referred to as a network externality.
Broadly, the private value to an individual of belonging to a network increases
with the number of endpoints to which that network connects. Put differently,
the private value an individual derives from participating in a network is that
the individual can communicate with the other network members. At the same
time, the individual’s participation creates value for other members by adding
to the number of endpoints.
There is an important difference between network externalities and other
forms of externality. Perhaps the most common textbook externality is pol-
lution; the economic activity of some individuals may produce pollutants that
affect a much broader set of people. While individuals make choices about par-
ticipation in the activity that generates pollution, they may have little choice as
to whether to be affected by pollution. In the extreme case of the greenhouse ef-
fect, for instance, it may be impossible to avoid incurring the costs of pollution.
Pollution is an external cost that has effects beyond the set of people engaged
in the polluting activity. Network externalities, on the other hand, are more self-
contained. An individual’s decision to subscribe to a network creates external
beneﬁts for other subscribers by increasing the size of the network. Notice,
however, that in order to enjoy the effects of the externality, one must join
the network. The beneﬁts to network participation, although partially external
to the individual participant, are entirely internal to the network as a group.
Since the group is composed of individuals engaged in mutually voluntary
exchange with one another, one would expect the group’s organization and
pricing arrangements to take account of the “external” beneﬁts associated with
an individual’s participation.
In a payment network, the value of communication between two endpoints
is determined by the pattern of commerce. People at location A will place a
high value on being in a payment network with people from location B if there
is a high volume of commerce between the two locations. Since locations can
vary widely in the sets of places their people go to shop, there can be variety
among endpoints in both the private value of network participation and the
external value that an endpoint creates for others through its participation. For
a network to be sustainable, then, its services must be priced so that all of its
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must include all endpoints for which the total value of participation (private
plus external value) exceeds the resource cost of participation, and only those
endpoints.
This article proposes that the two standards of sustainability (which is
deﬁned more precisely below) and efﬁciency can form the basis of a positive
theory of private, multilateral clearing and settlement arrangements.3 Such a
theory is quite distinct from the conventional view that network effects, as a
form of externality, are a common source of market failure. This conventional
view arises from the analysis of the behavior of network participants under the
assumption that key organizational features of networks are exogenously ﬁxed.
By contrast, the theory presented below treats organizational arrangements as
the endogenous outcomes of interactions among participants. Understanding
the differences between these two theoretical perspectives is essential for un-
derstanding the role of central banks or other public entities in such activities.
The next section presents an abstract model of a network, gives some
possible payment system interpretations, and shows how the essential network
characteristics provide implications for network organizations. The following
sections discuss some of the elements of a more general (and complete) model
and apply some of the insights of the analysis to some historical and contempo-
rary payment network issues. In particular, Section 3 discusses check clearing
prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve and current issues involving ATM
networks. In the former case, many observers have argued that check clear-
ing was inefﬁcient, as evidenced by the fact that checks sometimes followed
very indirect routes in proceeding from initial deposit to ﬁnal clearing. In the
latter case, the use of surcharges (charged by an ATM-owning institution to
depositors from other institutions) has been cited as an inefﬁcient exploitation
of market power in private networks. Section 3 will present the argument that
the empirical facts of both these cases are consistent with a theory that predicts
efﬁcient private network organizations.
1. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF A NETWORK
While network effects have often been said to be present in a variety of indus-
tries that are not explicitly networks, the focus here is on explicit networks.4
3 Sharkey (1985) and Henriet and Moulin (1996), for instance, follow this approach to the
theory of network structure and pricing.
4 For instance, some authors have suggested the presence of such an externality in the market
for personal computer operating systems; from a given set of alternatives, buyers prefer to have
the system that is more widely chosen. In this case, the externality comes from the indirect effect
that a system’s popularity has on the likely availability of application software. Indeed, one might
argue that a network effect is present in the retail grocery industry; the value to consumers of
shopping at a larger store (or chain) might be enhanced by the store’s ability to attract a wider set
of suppliers, thereby offering the shopper greater variety. For a general survey of network effects,
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In particular, the focus is on two-way networks where the underlying service
for which people have a demand involves transmissions between two particular
individuals. One can think of such a transmission as communication and the
underlying product as a message sent from one speciﬁc individual to another.
The model created below speciﬁes the communication and consumption op-
portunities available to people in the economy.
An Economy with Consumption and Communication
To create an economic model of a network, imagine a set of individuals, each
of whom lives at a distinct location, separated from the others. One can imagine
any number of individuals, and in general one might denote the set of individual
agents as {1, 2, . . . , N}. The key insights from the analysis can be gained
from a simple example with three agents. Each individual derives utility from
sending messages to some subset of the other individuals. Again, there is a wide
array of possible patterns of desired communication. In particular, there may be
heterogeneity in the overall value agents place on communication. Some agents
may desire to send messages to a large number of recipients, while others may
wish to communicate with only a few. The pattern of desired messages that is
represented in Figure 1 has this feature. Agent 1 desires only to send a message
to agent 3. Agent 2 derives utility from sending messages to agents 1 and 3,
while agent 3 would like to send to agents 1 and 2. It is useful to assume
that, in addition to communication, agents receive utility from consumption of
a generic good and that each agent begins with an endowment of this good.
An agent’s preferences for consumption and communication can be stated
more formally as follows. Let Ji be the set of other agents with whom agent i
wishes to communicate. Hence, in Figure 1, J1 = {3}, J2 = {1,3}, and J3 =
{1,2}. For any set J, use the notation n(J) to denote the number of elements
in that set; for instance, n(J3) = 2. The agent receives utility v for each unit
of communication, and utility is linear in consumption. If xi denotes agent i’s
consumption of the generic good and Ui denotes the agent’s utility, then Ui =
n(Ji)v + xi.
A model must also specify the technology available for communication.
In particular, suppose there are two ways to communicate. A message can
be sent by direct, bilateral communication at a cost (to the sender) of c0, in
units of the generic good. Alternatively, agents can buy access to a network. A
network is a set of “connected” agents. If an agent is connected to a network,
then messages to any other agent connected to the same network are costless.
The cost, again in units of the generic good, of connecting an individual to
a network is cs > c0. A more general speciﬁcation of network costs might
include a ﬁxed (infrastructure) cost, a cost that is variable in the number of
agents connected (like cs per connected agent in the present speciﬁcation) and
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Figure 1 A Simple Example of Demand for Network Services
Agent 1
Agent 2 Agent 3
An arrow from one agent to another indicates that the
first agent wishes to "send a message" to the second.
+
captured by the simple speciﬁcation given here is that, by expending resources
to connect to one another, agents can reduce their costs per unit of commu-
nication. If we assume that the (utility) value of sending a message (v) is at
least c0, and that the agents’ endowment of the consumption good is at least
2c0, then each agent will send all desired messages even in the absence of a
network connection (the most any agent would spend on communication, if all
communication was bilateral, is 2c0).
An efﬁcient network is one which includes all agents whose private and
external beneﬁts of membership exceed the cost of connection and includes
no other agents. To state this deﬁnition formally, one needs some additional
notation. Let S be a possible network. That is, S is some subset of the agents.
This set might also be termed a coalition. The private value to individual i
of being a member of the connected set S depends on the number of other
agents in S with whom i wishes to communicate. Letting JS
i denote this set,
the relevant number of connected agents for i is given by n(JS
i ). Formally, JS
i
is the intersection of the sets S and Ji. Network membership does not change
the actual amount of communication in which i engages; it is still worthwhile
to communicate bilaterally with all who are in Ji but not in S. Therefore, the
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in bilateral communication costs. For agent i, this value is n(JS
i )c0, since agent
i wishes to send a single message to each of the other agents with whom he
communicates.
In addition to the private value, agent i’s membership in S creates value for
other members of S. Deﬁne Hi as the set of agents who wish to communicate
with i. Hence, in Figure 1, H1 = {2,3}, H2 = {3}, and H3 = {1,2}. Agent
i’s membership in S creates value for all agents in Hi who are also in S. These
agents are denoted HS
i , the intersection of the sets Hi and S. The external value
created by i’s membership in S is n(HS
i )c0. With the private and external values
of membership speciﬁed, one can state the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1: An efﬁcient network is a set of agents S∗ such that5
(1) [n(JS
i ) + n(HS
i )]c0 ≥ cs for all i in S∗, and
(2) [n(JS
i ) + n(HS
i )]c0 < cs for all i not in S∗.
Condition (1) states that if agent i is in the network S∗, then the private-plus-
external beneﬁts from i’s membership equal or exceed the connection cost.
Condition (2) states that if private-plus-external beneﬁts are less than the con-
nection cost, then agent i is not in the network. Under the additional assumption
that 3cs < 5c0 (costs of universal connection are less than total communication
costs in the absence of a network), an efﬁcient network for the example of
Figure 1 is one that includes all three agents.
Behavior of Agents in the Economy with an
Exogenous Organizational Structure
Given an economic environment such as the one just described, how does one
predict an outcome? In particular, what sort of network will emerge? Will it be
efﬁcient? How will agents share the costs and beneﬁts of network connection?
One approach to these questions is to assume a certain form of competition
among potential networks. That is, one might assume a particular game played
by the participants in the economy. To this end, it is useful to assume that
there is an additional set of agents who have access to the network technology
and derive utility only from the consumption good. These agents compete by
offering network services to the agents who have a demand for communication.
For simplicity, suppose that the services of these potential network providers
are incompatible; each provider’s network is unique and cannot be connected
to other providers’ networks. The “rules of the game” dictate the types of offers
5 To be precise, the notation in Deﬁnition 1 should specify the particular network S∗. For
instance, JS
i should be JS∗
i . When there is only a single network, as in Deﬁnition 1, suppressing
the extra notation introduces no ambiguity. Further, for this economic environment the assumption
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the sellers are allowed to make as well as the allowed responses by network
users.
One possible game through which network providers could compete pro-
ceeds as follows. First, each potential provider announces an access price and
stands ready to provide access to all comers at that price. Next, agents choose
whether and from whom to buy access. Finally, communication and consump-
tion take place. This game will be referred to as the uniform price-setting game.
This name reﬂects the fact that sellers are not permitted to price discriminate by
offering different prices to different buyers. The predicted outcome of a game
is its Nash equilibrium, which is a set of strategies (price offers by providers
and network choices by buyers) such that each player’s (agent’s) strategy is
(privately) optimal, given the strategies of all the other players. Sellers in this
game essentially bid for the right to provide network services to all who sign
up. Since each potential provider is just as capable as all the others, price
competition will tend to drive proﬁts to zero. With uniform price setting, this
competition can lead to extreme results, as in the following.
Result 1: In the equilibrium of the uniform price-setting game for the
environment described by Figure 1, no agent purchases network
access, so all communication is bilateral.
To see that this result is true, note ﬁrst that the connection fee must be at least
cs, since sellers have no incentive to sell at a loss. Agent 1, however, will not
pay cs to join the network, since joining saves him at most bilateral costs of
c0 (if agent 3 is in the network). Without agent 1 in the network, connection
is not worth cs to the other agents, so the equilibrium network is empty.
This result is a stark example of the general ﬁnding that under certain
forms of competition equilibrium involves networks of inefﬁcient size.6 For
the uniform price-setting game, such a result arises whenever there is at least
one agent for whom the greatest possible private beneﬁts of connection are
less than the connection cost but for whom the private-plus-external beneﬁts
exceed costs. Such an agent is one who has a relatively low personal demand
for communication but with whom many others wish to communicate (an agent
for whom n(Ji) is small and n(Hi) is large).
An Alternative Model of Behavior: Sustainability
Results like Result 1 are useful for understanding the nature of competition in
network markets. Their usefulness is limited, however, because they typically
apply to speciﬁc games. The variety of games that might be played is virtually
endless, even for the very simple economy of Figure 1. Would other games
yield different results? In particular, are there games for which the equilibrium
6 See Economides (1996) for a survey of such results.32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
network is efﬁcient? The process of searching over all possible games is an
impractical approach to the economic analysis of such environments. An alter-
native is to look directly at possible outcomes (allocations of network services
and the consumption good) and ask which outcomes are sustainable, in a well-
deﬁned sense. In particular, suppose a certain allocation has been tentatively
agreed upon by the agents in the economy. That allocation is sustainable if
no subset of the agents can make themselves better off by allocating their
own endowed resources among themselves. In the present environment, such
a deviation from a proposed allocation would involve the subset of agents, or
coalition, forming its own network and communicating with all other agents
bilaterally; this coalition might also choose to reallocate its members’ endow-
ments of consumption goods, net of connection costs.7
To state this sustainability property more formally, an allocation in this
economy can be deﬁned as a network S and a payment for each agent, pi, toward
covering connection costs.8 In considering possible deviations from proposed
allocations by coalitions, it is sufﬁcient to consider a coalition of any size that
deviates to form a single network; if there were an incentive for a coalition to
form two distinct networks, then each network would have its own incentive
to form, regardless of whether the other forms. Letting p = (p1,p2, . . . ,pN),
we can now deﬁne sustainability as follows.
Deﬁnition 2: An allocation (S,p) is sustainable if there does not exist
a network S0 and a payment allocation p0 such that
(1) p0
i + n(Ji − S0)c0 ≤ pi + n(Ji − JS
i )c0 for each i in S0, with
strict inequality for some i in S0, and
(2)
P
i in S0 p0
i ≥ n(S0)cs.
In the above deﬁnition, the notation A − B for two sets A and B means all
elements of A that are not in B (the complement of B on A). The ﬁrst condition
states that each agent in the deviating network S0 is made better off by joining
that network (and at least one is made strictly better off). An agent is made
better off if his total outlays for bilateral communication and connection pay-
ments are reduced. The second condition is that the network collect enough in
payments to pay for connecting all of its members.
One important fact to note about sustainability is that a sustainable allo-
cation must be efﬁcient. If it were not, a coalition consisting of an efﬁcient
network could form and arrange an allocation satisfying the two conditions
above. In the case represented by Figure 1, a sustainable allocation will involve
7 A sustainable allocation is deﬁned here as an allocation in the core of the economy.
8 In principle, one can allow for the existence of more than one network, although in this en-
vironment any allocation with more than one network is either equivalent to or (Pareto) dominated
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a single network consisting of all three agents. The remaining task is to de-
termine how the costs of connecting the agents (3cs) should be shared among
the three. As we have already seen, charging each agent cs does not work;
agent 1 can be charged no more than c0. The remaining cost (3cs − c0) must
be covered by charges to agents 2 and 3, with the restriction that neither can
be charged more than 2c0, the cost to each of sending all messages bilaterally.
Hence, one possible cost allocation is for agent 1 to pay c0, agent 2 to pay 2c0,
and agent 3 to pay 3(cs −c0). These prices give no agent an incentive to leave
the network and send all communications bilaterally. The prices also leave no
incentive for any pair of agents to form a separate, two-agent network and
communicate with the third bilaterally. Hence, with these prices the efﬁcient
network is sustainable. This result is summarized below.
Result 2: In the case of Figure 1, a sustainable allocation has an efﬁcient
network S = {1,2,3} and any payments (p1,p2,p3) satisfying
p1 ≤ c0, p2 ≤ 2c0, p3 ≤ 2c0, and p1 + p2 + p3 = 3cs.
A Sustainable Allocation as the Outcome of a Game
Returning now to the question of competitive games played by potential pro-
viders of network services, does there exist a game under which the equilibrium
network is the efﬁcient network? Suppose, as before, that a large number of
(incompatible) network service providers compete for subscribers. Instead of
requiring that competition be only in the form of nondiscriminating access
prices, suppose that the sellers can make any type of price offer they wish.
That is, price offers can be in the form of a distinct price for each buyer. Refer
to this game as the perfectly discriminating price-setting game. Equilibrium
prices for this form of competitive bidding correspond to the sustainable cost
allocations speciﬁed above.9
Result 3: Equilibria of the perfectly discriminating price-setting game are
sustainable allocations.
To see this, suppose a seller has offered a set of prices satisfying the con-
ditions stated in Result 2. Can any other seller offer prices that win customers
from the ﬁrst and yield a proﬁt? In order to attract any individual buyer, a
competing offer must give that buyer a lower price. In order to cover costs,
however, the payment from at least one other buyer must be raised, so it is
impossible to attract more than one buyer. If all buyers do not join, network
connection is not attractive. Hence, a payment allocation satisfying the sustain-
ability conditions cannot be undercut. On the other hand, any set of prices that
9 There are many equilibria corresponding to many core allocations. In all of them, agent 1’s
access price is no greater than c0, agents 2 and 3 face prices no greater than 2c0, and all agents
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leaves a seller with strictly positive proﬁts can be undercut. Accordingly, the
sustainable allocations correspond with the set of equilibria.
The most notable feature of sustainable pricing arrangements is that, in
order to support an efﬁcient network, they require the subsidization of agent
1’s connection by the other two agents; agent 1’s connection fee must be less
than the resource cost of connecting him. The other agents are willing to cover
the remainder of the cost, because agent 1’s (social) value to the network
exceeds the (private) value he places on network access. This example illus-
trates a general point about arrangements that support efﬁcient networks in
environments in which agents are heterogeneous in the way they value net-
work participation. Beneﬁts (and possibly the costs) of network participation
have a collective component. The key to sustaining an efﬁcient network is in
the distribution of these collective beneﬁts and costs. This distribution must
respect the capability of agents to leave the network, either individually or in
groups. In a setting with heterogeneous agents, it can quite easily arise that the
appropriate distribution of costs and beneﬁts require that different agents pay
different prices for essentially the same service.
The pricing arrangements that satisfy the conditions in Result 2 involve
perfect price discrimination; they require that prices be tailored for each indi-
vidual buyer of network services. Perfect discrimination is not always feasible.
If, for instance, there is uncertainty about demands for network services and
an individual’s true demand characteristics are private information, then prices
cannot be as ﬁnely targeted as in the above example. In this case, private
information imposes further constraints on attainable allocations. It is possible
to incorporate such constraints into the notion of sustainable arrangements. In
such settings, pricing arrangements are likely to involve a less perfect form of
price discrimination. For instance, prices for network services may be tied to
observable characteristics or actions that are correlated with true demand. In an
environment similar to the one discussed in this section, access prices that vary
with the amount of communication might be able to achieve the desired price
discrimination in a way that allows privately informed buyers to self-select
among alternative pricing options.
2. ELEMENTS OF A GENERAL PAYMENT
NETWORK MODEL
The model and example of the previous section were speciﬁed in terms of a
generic communication service. The same sort of network structure, however,
can arise in a model that is speciﬁed in such a way as to capture important
aspects of payment system markets. Any noncash payment mechanism is a
communication network in a fundamental sense. An instrument presented in
payment for goods or services is an instruction to transfer monetary value from
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communication between the point of sale and the location or institution at which
the buyer’s value is held. This section sketches some of the ingredients of a
general payment network model. The key point is that the private and external
values to individuals of being connected to a payment network depend on the
underlying pattern of commerce.
An Economy with Payment Services
As in the above section, suppose that there is a set of N distinct locations
at which agents live and economic activity takes place. Unlike the previous
section, suppose that there is a large number of agents living at each loca-
tion. Agents consume two types of goods: a generic good and location-speciﬁc
goods. Different people have different preferences for location-speciﬁc goods.
In particular, each agent desires the speciﬁc good from exactly one location.
One might, for instance, denote by φij the fraction of agents from location i who
wish to consume the specialized good at location j. These fractions determine
the economy’s pattern of commerce. Agents travel from their home location
to the locations at which they wish to consume and purchase location-speciﬁc
goods with claims on amounts of generic goods (or with the generic good
itself). In some environments, one might also imagine that these transactions
are made using government-issued ﬁat currency.
Making transactions across locations is costly. This cost might arise from
a number of frictions. If debt claims are created in the purchase of location-
speciﬁc goods, then there may be costs associated with communicating in-
formation about these claims across locations or in making ﬁnal payment. If
buyers carry the generic good with them to make purchases, there may be
transportation costs or other losses incurred on the way. Finally, if traveling
for consumption takes time and buyers carry non-interest-bearing currency for
transaction purposes, then there may be a seigniorage cost associated with
location-speciﬁc consumption. The speciﬁc nature of the costs depends on the
details of the economic environment.
As above, suppose that there is a technology for connecting locations in
a network for the purpose of clearing and settling payment obligations. While
connection may involve a ﬁxed cost, the variable cost of making transactions
among connected locations is lower than between locations that are not con-
nected. For instance, if payment for location-speciﬁc goods requires shipment
of generic goods, a network that allows multilateral communication and calcu-
lation of net obligations may economize on shipping costs. Alternatively, in a
monetary economy, a network that allows people to substitute debt claims for
currency may allow agents to save on seigniorage costs.
The value to agents at a particular location of being connected to the
network depends on which other locations are connected. In particular, agents
at location i place a high value on being in a network that includes locations
j for which the fractions φij are large. By the same token, a location at which36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
many people want to shop (j such that φij is large for many i) is one that brings
a high external value to any network it joins. Hence the notion of sustainable
pricing of network services, as presented in the previous section, will imply
that these popular locations receive preferential treatment in the pricing of
network services. As is the case for location 1 in the example of Figure 1,
there could easily be locations for which the private value of network services
is small while the external value is large. These would be locations that attract
many consumers from elsewhere but whose residents consume mostly their own
location-speciﬁc goods. Pricing to support an efﬁcient network could require
that such locations pay less than the cost of connecting them, as is the case in
the example.
Payments-related models that have the features outlined in this section will
have the same implications as the example from the previous section. Network
industries will tend to be organized in ways that achieve sustainable allocations.
This means, ﬁrst, that there is a tendency toward efﬁcient network structures.
Second, the sharing of the costs and beneﬁts of network organizations must
respect the ability of participants to form or join alternative organizations. Ac-
cordingly, network members who bring large external beneﬁts to other members
may need to receive a share of the net beneﬁts that appears to be out of line
with those members’ own use of the network services. Such an impression mis-
takenly focuses only on an individual’s private beneﬁts of network participation
and not the beneﬁts that an individual brings to other participants.
Barriers to Competition
An important maintained assumption in the foregoing discussion is that any
agent or group of agents that is dissatisﬁed with an arrangement is free to
pursue an alternative. That is, there are no barriers to entry. Various types of
barriers might arise in economic environments. For instance, if all agents do
not have access to the same technological capabilities, then it might be difﬁcult
for agents that are dissatisﬁed with their network services to set up or seek out
an alternative network. Also, there may be investments in network provision
or participation that, once made, represent sunk costs. A sunk cost is a cost
that cannot be fully recovered. In this case, an incumbent network would have
a cost advantage over a competitor; while the competitor must incur the sunk
costs, those costs are no longer part of the incumbent’s decision calculus.
Other barriers to competition might arise from legal restrictions. For in-
stance, if sellers were to face a legal prohibition of price discrimination, then
the types of network services arrangements they could offer would be sharply
limited; as seen above, price discrimination can be essential for the efﬁcient
provision of network services with heterogeneous buyers. Other legal barriers
might take the form of restrictions on which particular sellers can offer which
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A ﬁnal form of potential barrier that is worth noting arises from the be-
havior of sellers themselves. An incumbent seller of network services might
attempt to impose rules on its buyers that make it difﬁcult for them to switch to a
competing service. The possibility of restrictive rules set by network providers
has been a subject of interest in recent policy discussions concerning ATM
network mergers.
If there were barriers to competition, then an inefﬁcient network structure
could persist. In such a case, can public policy intervention improve on private
market performance? The answer depends on the source of the barriers. In the
United States and other developed economies, enforcement of antitrust laws is
in part intended to guard against the anticompetitive use of restrictive rules by
sellers in their contracts with buyers. In cases where a barrier to competition
is the result of a legal restriction on the behavior of market participants, such
restrictions might have other public purposes. Here, as in the case where barriers
may have technological sources, it may be difﬁcult or impossible for public
intervention to remove the barriers. In these cases, an incumbent provider might
extract monopoly rents, for instance, by inefﬁciently limiting network size.10
In such cases regulation of the pricing and product offerings of an incum-
bent seller might be useful in promoting network efﬁciency. Governments in
many economies have traditionally taken this approach to telecommunications
markets.
3. TWO APPLICATIONS
One can apply the logic presented above to a number of actual payment network
examples. This section will provide a brief discussion of two such examples,
one historical and one current. The historical example involves the process
of clearing checks in the United States in the period prior to the founding
of the Federal Reserve System. The current example involves the growing
geographical reach of multibank ATM networks.
Check Clearing before the Federal Reserve
By the late nineteenth century, checks had already become a dominant form of
payment. As the banking industry was highly fragmented, a signiﬁcant portion
of all checks were interbank checks. Clearing of checks between the depositor’s
and the check writer’s bank occurred in one of a number of ways.11 A bank
10 Of course, even a monopoly immune to competition will not necessarily produce inefﬁ-
cient results. If the monopolist has sufﬁcient ability to price discriminate, monopoly behavior can
approach full efﬁciency. In this case, the monopolist’s rents come at the expense of consumer
welfare but not at the expense of total welfare.
11 For a recent discussion of pre-Fed check clearing see Gilbert and Summers (1996). A
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holding checks drawn on accounts at another bank could present the items
directly, in person, at the paying bank. By law, the paying bank was required
to make payment on such checks without imposing any presentment fee. On
the other hand, checks that were presented through the mail could be subject to
a fee imposed by the paying bank. Banks could also clear checks through the
services of an intermediary, or correspondent bank. Banks with a correspondent
relationship might have entered into a mutual agreement to accept checks from
one another without imposing fees.
At a time when bank branching was limited by law, correspondent rela-
tionships were particularly important for clearing checks in cases where the
paying bank was relatively distant from the bank in which the check was ini-
tially deposited. If both banks had correspondent relationships with the same
intermediary bank, then collection of the item could proceed free of fees. In
this sense, any two banks that were connected by a chain of correspondent
relationships belonged to a network. How was the composition of such net-
works likely to have been determined? The value to a bank of belonging to a
network depended on the frequency with which the bank received checks drawn
on other members of the network. Further, if there were particular institutions
that had relatively frequent and large volume interactions with many other
banks, then such institutions would naturally serve as central intermediaries in
a correspondent network. For instance, a city bank might deal with a number of
country banks in the surrounding region. The city bank might, in turn, maintain
relationships with banks in other cities that serve as correspondents for their
regions. This organization of a check-clearing network could economize on the
costs of shipping checks. A small bank in a remote town could, for instance,
send a single shipment of all its out-of-town checks to its correspondent, with
the links between larger correspondents serving as “trunk lines.”
In a correspondent network like that described above, consider the problem
faced by a bank that receives a check drawn on an institution with which it
rarely deals. The receiving bank could send the item directly to the paying
bank. In this case, however, the paying bank might charge a fee for present-
ment. Alternatively, the receiving bank could send the item, along with its usual
shipment, to its correspondent bank. Then, through a chain of correspondent
relationships, the check might ultimately be paid at its par value (with no
presentment fee). This indirect alternative has two potential sources of savings.
First, presentment fees might be avoided. Second, there may be savings on the
costs of transporting checks. The marginal cost of adding an item to a routine
shipment is virtually zero, certainly smaller than the postage cost of sending
a single item directly. Indeed, similar economies may have been available at
the receiving end of check shipments. A paying bank may have found it more
convenient and cost effective to receive and process bundles of checks sent by
intermediaries with whom it had a standing relationship.J. A. Weinberg: Private Payment Networks 39
The Circuitous Routing of Checks
The history of check clearing during the period that preceded the founding of
the Fed contains examples of checks traveling over circuitous routes to get from
the banks in which they were initially deposited to the paying banks. A bank of
ﬁrst deposit, for example, might have sent a check to its correspondent located
to the east even though the paying bank was located to the west. There are
two possible interpretations of such examples. On the one hand, such instances
might provide evidence of an inefﬁciency created by paying banks’ ability to
assess presentment fees. On the other hand, such cases could be consistent with
the operation of an efﬁcient correspondent network. The pattern of links in the
network (correspondent relationships) was determined by the usual pattern of
commerce. The occasional circuitous route for check clearing resulted simply
because there were occasional exceptions to the usual pattern of commerce.
Given the existing links, it was efﬁcient to send these occasional items together
with routine shipments. Indeed, in this view, it is possible that presentment fees
reinforced network efﬁciency by reducing the incentive for individual banks to
bypass the network.
The second interpretation is consistent with the analytical framework sug-
gested above. Under this interpretation, presentment fees may have actually
reinforced efﬁcient check-clearing relationships by discouraging the direct pre-
sentment of occasional, solitary items. Those few items that were sent directly
and on which presentment fees were paid are likely to have been items for
which the bank of ﬁrst deposit could not foresee a sufﬁciently reliable chain of
correspondent relationships. That is, these were items for which the bank that
was due payment had little alternative to direct presentment (through the mail).
Accordingly, such items would constitute a market segment (in the market
for clearing by direct presentment through the mail) with relatively inelastic
demand. The efﬁciency cost of charging a high price (above marginal cost) to
market segments with inelastic demand is relatively small; with inelastic de-
mand, quantity purchased does not decline much as the price is raised. In other
words, presentment fees allowed paying banks to price discriminate between
institutions with good alternatives to direct presentment and those without such
alternatives. It is entirely possible that the effects of such discrimination were
primarily distributional. While some buyers gain at the expense of others, price
discrimination typically increases the exploitation of gains from trade relative
to uniform pricing in the presence of market power.12
ATM Networks
An ATM transaction, like a check transaction, can require interbank clearing
and settlement. When the holder of an ATM card issued by one bank makes a
12 Each paying bank had some market power in the sense that it was the only bank that
could provide ﬁnal settlement of a check.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
withdrawal at an ATM owned by another bank (or perhaps by a nonbank busi-
ness), the transaction must be cleared by communicating information about the
withdrawal to the card-issuing bank and settled with an appropriate transfer
of funds from the issuer to the ATM owner. In recent years, multibank ATM
networks have become increasingly important in allowing cardholders to access
their funds at ever widening sets of locations.13 A regional ATM network is
usually organized as a joint venture owned by some or all of its participating
banks. The network typically has a brand name that is placed on its members’
machines and cards.
Membership in an ATM network is valuable to a bank mainly because
access to the network’s set of ATM locations enhances the value of the ATM
services the bank offers its depositors. Clearly, membership is more valuable
the more extensive the network’s set of locations. A bank’s membership also
brings “external” beneﬁts to other members by adding to the set of locations.
Some locations, however, are more valuable than others. For instance, banks
(and their customers) may place a high value on having access to an ATM at
a vacation resort. Such a location may be one for which the external beneﬁts
of network participation are greater than the private beneﬁts to the owner of
the particular ATM. The theory presented above suggests that a sustainable
network will need to price its services or share its proﬁts so as to allow the
ATM owner to realize some of the external beneﬁts of its participation.
Surcharges
There are a number of ways in which network arrangements could induce
participation of institutions that bring large external beneﬁts. For instance, if
the network imposes membership fees, lower fees could be set for members
with more desirable locations. Similarly, if the network is organized as a joint
venture, then arrangements for proﬁt sharing could conceivably reﬂect differ-
ences in the values of members’ locations. Since the values of locations are
likely to be related to the intensity of ATM use, prices based on transactions
might also be used for allocating network costs and beneﬁts. In ATM networks,
when a cardholder from one member uses the ATM of another member, the
cardholder’s bank pays an “interchange” fee to the ATM owner. Since this fee
is typically set by the network and is usually a uniform, per-transaction charge,
its ﬂexibility for cost and beneﬁt sharing is limited. Owners might also be able
to realize some of the network beneﬁts of desirable locations by imposing a
transaction fee directly on the cardholder. Cardholders’ willingness to pay such
fees, known as surcharges, would depend on the value of having access to
cash at the particular location and on the degree of competition for cash access
services at that location.
13 A description and history of ATM networks are found in Baker (1996).J. A. Weinberg: Private Payment Networks 41
Many regional ATM networks, as well as the national networks owned by
the Visa and Mastercard associations, once had implicit or explicit agreements
among their members banning surcharges. These restrictions were ultimately
challenged, often by owners of ATMs at high-value locations.14 The debate over
surcharges centers on two opposing interpretations of the role such fees play
in the market. One interpretation holds that a ban on surcharges prevents ATM
owners from abusing the monopoly power they gain from having desirable
locations. The other interpretation is suggested by the arguments presented in
this article; surcharges support the formation of efﬁcient networks by allowing
participants who bring large external beneﬁts to the network to capture some
of those beneﬁts. Under this second view, a ban on surcharges is an attempt
by network owners to impose a certain distribution of network beneﬁts, a
distribution that may not be sustainable.
Does the second view imply that monopoly rents earned by ATM owners
with particularly advantageous locations do not create the inefﬁciency usually
associated with monopoly power? Not necessarily. If a network includes some
truly unique locations and there is no possibility of entry by a competitor at
those locations, then the unique locations are essentially natural monopolies.
Banning surcharges does not eliminate the rents from those monopoly posi-
tions. Rather, a ban is an attempt to spread those rents among all the banks
in the network. If a network includes valuable locations offering equal access
for customers of all network members but not for nonmembers, then members
can extract rents in the fees they charge their customers for account services
that include ATM access. In this case, the rents would be extracted from all
customers, even those with no demand for access to the highly valued locations.
Allowing surcharges, on the other hand, allows monopoly rents to be collected
in a more discriminatory fashion. Such price discrimination can have the effect
of reducing the inefﬁciency from monopoly power.
A second important point about monopoly rents is that an ATM owner’s
ability to extract rents is limited by competitors’ ability to enter monopolized
market segments. Hence, the primary public policy concern with market power
should be “How is it maintained?” rather than “How is it exploited?” Com-
petitors’ incentives to enter markets by placing ATMs at particular locations
is greatest when owners can earn location-speciﬁc rents. Hence, a ban on sur-
charges creates a situation in which incentives to engage in location-speciﬁc
competition are muted.
14 See for instance Bank Network News, September 13, 1995.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. CONCLUSION
The theoretical framework presented above suggests that the organization of
networks is driven by the desire of market participants to devise sustainable
multilateral arrangements. In both of the cases discussed in the previous section,
the framework leads one to interpret observed network structures and pricing
arrangements as components of an efﬁcient arrangement. Such an arrangement
must take into consideration both the private value that participants derive from
the network and the external beneﬁts that participants bring to the network.
Hence, in a world with heterogeneous demands for network services, price
discrimination and other means of “unevenly” distributing the net beneﬁts of
network services can be essential for supporting efﬁcient network structures.
Does this article’s framework necessarily imply that all actual networks
are efﬁcient and that public intervention can never improve upon the eco-
nomic performance of a private network? As discussed in Section 3 above,
this best-of-all-possible-worlds result holds strictly only when there are no
barriers that prevent groups of economic agents from pursuing the alterna-
tives of their choice. The role of public policy, therefore, is to understand the
sources of barriers to such choice. There may be some cases in which barriers
are technological and cannot be overcome. In these cases, some regulation
of pricing practices might be called for. This argument, however, is nothing
more than the traditional justiﬁcation of regulation of a natural monopoly. In
other cases, barriers may be created through the rules imposed by incumbent
providers of network services in an attempt to preserve market share. Public
intervention to eliminate such rules could be beneﬁcial. This argument closely
mirrors traditional justiﬁcations for antitrust scrutiny of the conduct of ﬁrms
with large market shares. In all cases, the framework begins with a presumption
of efﬁciency. This presumption is expressed by the question, “If all economic
decisionmakers are always free to make alternative arrangements, why wouldn’t
the arrangement on which they actually agree be efﬁcient?” This presumption
seems also to be a good place for public policy to begin.
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